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B.

STEPHENS**

Testamentary disposition of personal property generally falls into
one of three categories:' (1) a specific legacy, similar to a specific
devise of real estate, passes designated items of personal property to
the legatee named in the will;2 (2) a general pecuniary legacy, instead of designating specific property, provides for a fixed amount
of money to be paid to a named beneficiary;3 and (8) a residuary
legacy passes the residue of the estate (after debts and claims and
other testamentary dispositions) to the residuary legatees. 4 This
article does not attempt to detail the technical differences and variations in testamentary dispositions of money or property. 5 Instead,
it is the income tax consequences of these various dispositions that
are given consideration. Moreover, we ignore here the tax significance
of the payment of the very thing bequeathed6 so as to focus our
attention on certain collateral rights of the recipient.
*This article is one part of a book entitled Federal Income Taxation of
Estates and Beneficiaries, to be published by Little, Brown & Co. in 1968.
"James J. Freeland, A.B. 1950, Duke University; LL.B. 1954, University of
Florida; Member, The Florida Bar; Visiting Associate Professor 1962-1963 and
Professor of Law 1964-1965, New York University; Professor of Law, University
of Florida.
Richard B. Stephens, A.B. 1939, University of Rochester; LL.B. 1942, University of Michigan; Member, Bars of Illinois and the District of Columbia;
Visiting Professor of Law 1958-1960, University of Illinois; Professor of Law,
University of Florida.
1. Demonstrative legacies, not mentioned here, are described in ATKINSON,
WLS 734 (2d ed. 1953).
2. Id. at 732-33. In many instances the classical terminology distinctions between "bequests" or "legacies" of personal property and "devises" of real property
have been obliterated by usage. The terms are frequently used interchangeably.
Id. at 4. See also, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§731.03 (2), (5), (6), (10), (11) (1965), providing
that the words "bequest," "devise," and "legacy" may be used interchangeably.
3. See ATKINSON, WULs 733-34 (2d ed. 1953).
4. Id. at 736.
5. For detailed consideration of the nontax aspects of such dispositions see 6
BOwE-PARKMR: PAGE ON WILES §§48.1-.10 (3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
BOWE-PARKER].
6. In many instances brief reference is made in this article to matters dealt
with comprehensively in other parts of a book, of which this article is a part,
entitled Federal Income Taxation of Estates and Beneficiaries, to be published by
[591]
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What are the income tax consequences of rules of local law that
require the estate, in the case of pecuniary legacies, to pay interest
to the legatees, or in the case of specific legacies, to pay the income
earned by the specific property during the course of administration
to the legatee of such property? In the ensuing discussion, which
deals first with the interest and then the income question,7 it is
assumed that the subject matter of the bequest is a part of the estate.,
INTEREST ON LEGACIES

A general pecuniary legacy may bear interest in the absence of
a will provision directing that it be paid without interest. 9 Variations
among the several states, reflected both in statutes and in judicial decisions, concern mostly the period during which the interest is deemed
to accrue.10 The requirement that interest be paid on pecuniary
legacies, at least in some circumstances, is well established in most
jurisdictions." One logical approach is to say that interest runs from
the end of the nonclaim period when general pecuniary legacies may
become payable.1 2 In some states, interest is deemed to accrue only
from the time fixed by order of the probate court for distribution of
the legacy. 3 There are other variations.1 We make no attempt in
this article to deal with the varied provisions of state law, which
include differences in rates as well as interest periods. The discussion
Little, Brown & Co. in 1968. It should be said here, for example, that a bequest of
a specific sum of money or of specific property is generally received tax-free by
the recipient. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§102, 663 (a) (1). Obviously, no attempt is
made here to analyze the specific bequest concept or its limitations.
7. See discussion in text following heading INCOME ON SPECIFIC LEGACIES infra.
8. Just as some property owned by a decedent, such as tenancy-by-the-entirety
property, passes outside the probate estate, some property passes outside the estate
recognized for federal income tax purposes. This matter is explored in Stephens
& Freeland, The Federal Tax Meaning of Estates and Trusts, 18 TAx L. Rav. 251
(1963), also a part of the forthcoming book mentioned at note 6 supra. Suffice
to say here that the problems discussed in this article do not arise with respect
to property that is not considered a part of the estate for federal income tax
purposes.
9. 6 BOWE-PARKER §59.11, at 414.
10. Id. §59.13; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §234.2, at 1783 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter
cited as SCOTT]. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TRUSTS §234, comments c, e (1959);
Lewis, When Does Interest Begin To Run on Legacies?, 16 MINN. L. REV. 226

(1932).
11. Ibid.
12. 6 BOWE-PARKER §59.11, at 412.
13. Note 10 supra; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§731.22, 733.01 (2) (b) (1965); cf. Estate
of Harry S. Bond v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 180, 326 F.2d 999 (1964), involving
Connecticut law.

14. See 6 BOwE-PARKER §59.13, at 111.
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that follows assumes that an amount of interest is required to be paid
to a beneficiary entitled to a pecuniary legacy.
For income tax purposes, the pecuniary legacy itself may or may
not qualify for the inheritance exclusion under section 663 (a) (1) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.15 For example, a pecuniary formula bequest does not qualify for the protection of that section because
the amount of money, although ultimately determinable as a fixed
amount, is not ascertainable as of the date of the decedent's death.
It therefore lacks the specificity required by the exclusion provision.
Whenever a pecuniary legacy itself does not qualify for the inheritance exclusion, it becomes an amount required to be paid within
the general distribution rules and attracts a ratable amount of the
estate's "distributable net income,"' 16 usually resulting in gross income
to the beneficiary and a deduction to the estate.' 7 However, the
income tax consequences of the estate's payment of interest on a
pecuniary legacy are not determined by the tax classification accorded
the bequest itself and in some respects are not as dear.
If an amount paid on a pecuniary legacy is accurately identified
as interest for tax purposes, the payment by the estate should give
rise to an interest deduction under section 163.18 From the standpoint of the recipient, the statutory language raises some doubt,19
but the symmetry of Subchapter J, which presents the Code provisions
applicable to estates, would be destroyed if an amount deductible as
interest by the estate were includible in the gross income of the
recipient only within the limitations of D.N.I. and the distribution
rules. Thus, such amounts should be treated as gross income to the
recipient under section 61 (a) (4).20 But even if an amount is
denominated interest under local law, that may not be its correct
characterization for federal income tax purposes. 21 A question may
15. See note 6 supra.
16. INr. REv. CODE oF 1954, §643 (a). Distributable net income [hereinafter
abbreviated D.N.I.] is the estate's taxable income with some adjustments, and it
fixes the amount of distributions that is taxable to beneficiaries. See INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §662 (a). In this quantitative function it is like the "earnings and
profits" concept, which determines the extent to which a corporate distribution
gets divided treatment. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§301 (c) (1), 316. But it has
a qualitative function as well and works to characterize the income taxable to
the beneficiary, i.e., as ordinary income or capital gain.
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§662, 661. Estate distributions are accorded
extended coverage in the forthcoming book mentioned at note 6 supra.
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §641 (b) provides for computation of an estate's
taxable income generally in the same manner as in the case of individuals.
19. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§662 (a), 661 (a) (2).
20. See Treas. Reg. §1.61-7(a) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6723, 1964-1 CuM.
BuLL. 73, as amended, T.D. 6873, 1966 INT. REv. BuLL. 8, at 11.
21.

See Stephens & Freeland, The Role of Local Law and Local Adjudications in
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be raised whether the so-called "interest" is simply an amount "properly paid" within the meaning of the distribution rules. If so, the
payment would not be deductible or includible as interest, but the
estate's deduction would have to meet the tests of section 661 and
the includibility of the amount by the recipient would be governed
by section 662. What is the proper characterization of payments of
this type?
An attempt may be made to answer the question by a close
analysis of the nature of the payment. This would suggest the inquiry
in each case whether the pecuniary legatee is being compensated for
the estate's continuing use of money to which he is entitled. A
payment made for the use of money is considered interest for income
tax purposes. This would clearly stamp as "interest" amounts payable only after some delay in the payment of the pecuniary legacy
itself and, even more clearly, increments accrued after the beneficiary
had acquired an immediate right to be paid. Query as to "interest"
accrued from the date of death or any other time before the beneficiary can be viewed as having a possessory right?22
State law on administration of a decedent's estate may, as a
general rule, contemplate payment of pecuniary legacies within one
year after the decedent's death. It may also, however, recognize that
within such time administration may not have advanced to the point
where payment would be proper. In such circumstances the executor
may be given the right to defer payment, but the legatee may be
given a compensatory right to interest running from the date one
year after death. 23 This was the situation in a very early ruling. In
I.T. 1720,24 the Commissioner held that interest was received by the

beneficiary, "not as such beneficiary but as the designated payee of a
sum certain ... for the use of an amount due him . .. the payment

of which has been deferred."25 Since this payment was considered
truly interest, the payment by the estate entitled the estate to a
deduction, whether the amount was paid out of principal or out of
income. Since the interest received by the beneficiary was received
by him as a creditor, it constituted gross income to him, likewise
without regard to the distribution rules. Although the Ruling reflects
very little analysis of the state law requirement, the result seems
Federal Tax Controversies, 46 MINN. L. REV. 223 (1961), also constituting a part
of the book mentioned at note 6 supra.
22. See ATKINSON, WILLS 751-52 (2d ed. 1953); note 10 supra. See also FLA.
STAT. §731.22 (1965) providing for interest to accrue only after an order of distribution. See also Matter of Trescott, 199 Misc. 1087, 104 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Surr. Ct.
1951); Matter of Stanfield, 135 N.Y. 292, 31 N.E. 1013 (1892).
23. See BOWE-PARKER §59.13, at 111.
24. H1-2 CUM. BULL. 54 (1923).
25. Ibid.
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sound as the rights in question arose out of a delay in the payment
of a legacy beyond the usual date of payment. However, care should
be exercised not to read the ruling more broadly.
Under the current statute, and even under prior revenue acts,
the interest increment does not qualify as an excluded inheritance
of property,2 even if the pecuniary legacy itself does qualify. But
whether the interest is properly characterized as simply an inheritance
of income from property, taxable under the distribution rules, 27 or
as interest, taxable under section 61 (a) (4), remains obscure in many
cases. An answer to this question, which would cover even the
doubtful areas, could be furnished by Congress. In the absence of
specific provisions in the Code, this issue must be resolved by reference to the nature of the right under state law and the federal tax
definition of "interest," even though the result may be hostile to
28
a uniform application of the taxing statute.
The nature of the right and the reason for the interest requirement may vary in different jurisdictions or, in some cases, even within
the same jurisdiction concerning different beneficiaries. Thus, for
example, in Florida, in the absence of a will provision to the contrary,
interest at the legal rate is required to be paid and accrues only
"after the time fixed by the county judge in an order of distribution. . ... "29 Although the legacy is considered to "vest" in the
beneficiary as of the date of the testator's death, 30 his actual right to
receive payment begins only when the county judge issues his order.
It appears, therefore, that in states such as Florida the interest should
be treated as compensation for accepting a delay in the receipt of the
legacy3 ' if the amount is paid under the statute. This is consistent
with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in the case of United States v. Folckemer.32 There, a benefic26. See,e.g., Harrison v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1941), holding
that under Illinois law the interest received by a surviving spouse pursuant to a
compromise agreement settling a will contest has its source in the will; that, on
the facts presented, the interest is sufficiently similar to an income interest of a
trust beneficiary to be taxable to the beneficiary under what would now be §102 (b)
of the 1954 Code. The court applied the rule of Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
27. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§102 (b), 662 (a).

28. See Stephens & Freeland, supra note 21; note 38 infra and accompanying
text.
29.

FLA. STAT. §731.22 (1965).
30. FLA. STAT. §731.21 (1965).

31. Cf. Fosters Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942), affirming
45 B.T.A. 126 (1941); W. W. Clarke, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 758 (1944).
32. 307 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962), reversing the district court, 61-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 79639 (S.D. Tex. 1961). The United States district court found that the
interest qualified as an increment to the specific legacy and concluded erroneously
that it was within the protection of §102(a). The so-called interest could not
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iary to whom 100,000 dollars was bequeathed received an additional
13,000 dollars under a California statute that provides for interest on
pecuniary legacies if such legacies are not paid prior to the first
anniversary of the testator's death. Interest accrues at the rate of
four per cent from the date of such first anniversary. The legacy
itself qualified as a tax free inheritance under section 102 (a) ,3 but
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit properly held that the
34
interest was not within the inheritance exclusion of that section.
In holding the interest taxable as interest, outside the distribution
rules, the court in Folckemer noted that the taxpayer was "not an
income beneficiary of the estate." 35 While apparently true, this was
an unfortunate remark, for it is certainly clear that one who is an
income beneficiary could in another capacity receive interest on a
pecuniary bequest to him. The court's comment, really aimed only
36
at the one transaction, goes on to say:
He was the recipient of a money legacy. The statutory interest
payable to him is for the detention of his legacy beyond the
first anniversary of the testator's death. The conduit theory
. . . deals with the income tax treatment of estate income distributable to a beneficiary . . . . Here, the statutory interest
. . . has no relation to the scheme of distribution of estate

income ...
It is correct to say that in Folckemer the distribution rules did not
determine either taxability or deductibility of the interest payment.
However, the payment would affect the operation of the distribution
rules and the determination of the estate's tax liability, as the interest
3
would reduce taxable income and, correspondingly, D.N.1. 7
The mere fact that an amount is called "interest" is not enough
to make it interest for tax purposes.38 For federal income tax purpossibly qualify under INT. REV.

CODE OF

1954, §663 (a)(I).

33. This is for the reason that it met the provisions of INT. REv.

CODE

of

1954, §663 (a)(1).
34. The court of appeals, holding that the interest payment was not within
CODE OF 1954, §663 (a) (1), required a reversal of the district court
decision. The court then concluded that the interest was fully taxable on the basis
of the general "definition" of gross income, §61, and specifically §61 (a) (4), and
with reference to Treas. Reg. §1.61-7 (a) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6723, 1964-1
Cusf. BULL. 73, as amended, T.D. 6873, 1966 INT. REV. BULL. 8, at 11, providing
that the term "interest" includes "interest on legacies."
35. United States v. Folckemer, 307 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1952).
36. Ibid.
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§163, 643(a). See also note 16 supra. The recipient of the interest in Folckemer was taxed on the full amount received under
§61 (a) (4).
38. Cf. Johnson Locke Mercantile Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 434 (D.C.
INT. REV.
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poses, interest has been defined to mean "compensation allowed by
law or fixed by the parties for use or forebearance, or retention of
money."39 The court of appeals in United States v. Folckemer" found
that the tax definition embraced the statutory interest there involved.
Suppose in a jurisdiction such as Florida the will provides for
payment of interest on a general pecuniary bequest from the date of
death. Ordinarily, it will be recalled, interest would run only from
the time of the county judge's distribution order, 41 but the will may
provide otherwise. Here it would seem that the arrangement for
so-called "interest" contemplates something other than a mere payment of the legacy plus compensation for delay, and amounts paid in
addition to the legacy itself should be viewed as distributions, at
least amounts attributable to periods prior to the time at which
payment of the legacy itself is ordered.
Thinking along this line seems to have prompted the result in
Minnie L. Wolf.4 2 There, the Board had to determine the tax nature
of "interest" paid under Pennsylvania law to the testator's widow,
a pecuniary legatee. The state statute 43 in general provided that
interest on all pecuniary legacies should begin to run one year after
the date of the testator's death unless there was an earlier decree of
distribution, in which case interest was to run from the date of the
decree. Interest paid under such a provision would be recognized
as interest for tax purposes; 44 but the Pennsylvania statute goes on
5
to provide:4

mhat where a pecuniary legacy is bequeathed to or for the
use of the widow of the testator or any child .. . or for the
maintenance of any person, interest shall . . . begin to run

from the date of the death of the testator.

Cir. 1931).
39. Fall River Elec. Light Co., 23 B.T.A. 168, 171 (1931); Deputy v. DuPont,
308 U.S. 488, 497-98 (1940). Thus, in Anna M. B. Foster, 45 B.T.A. 126 (1941),
aff'd, 131 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942), the executor withheld distribution pursuant
to an agreement between himself and the beneficiary. Four years later the
executor paid $10,000 "as interest" to the beneficiary. The court held that the
payment constituted interest since it was paid for the privilege of keeping securities in the estate rather than having to sell them on an unfavorable market.
40. 307 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962).
41. FLA. STAT. §731.22 (1965); see text accompanying note 29 supra.
42. 32 B.T.A. 959 (1935), af'd, 84 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1936).
43. Pennsylvania Fiduciaries' Act of 1917, Pa. Laws 1917, Act 447, §21.
44. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
45. Pa. Laws 1917, Act 447, §21. (Emphasis added.) The interest provision of
the Pennsylvania statute quoted in the text is not uncommon. See 3 ScoTT, TRusTs
§234.2, at 1779 (2d ed. 1956). Cf. Treas. Reg. §1.661 (a)-2 (e) (1956).
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Pursuant to this further provision of the statute, the executor paid
the taxpayer 29,000 dollars as interest, which she did not report as
gross income. The taxpayer argued that the entire amount of socalled interest received by her was properly excluded from gross
income either as a tax-free bequest or as an allowance for maintenance
and support, which also might have escaped tax under then prevailing
federal income tax doctrine. The Commissioner did not seek to tax
the entire 29,000 dollars, as he might have done if it could properly
have been viewed as interest for tax purposes. Although the opinion
is obscure, his successful assertion of tax liability for 25,000 dollars
of the 29,000 dollar payment makes it clear that he viewed the transaction as a distribution. For the year in issue the estate had received
income of 40,000 dollars subject to tax and nontaxable income of
6,000 dollars. The 25,000 dollars taxed is the portion of the 29,000
dollars which the amount of estate income subject to tax (40,000 dollars) bears to the total estate income (46,000 dollars), including
6,000 dollars of nontaxable income. 46 Thus it is implicit in the Wolf
opinion that the so-called interest was regarded as a distribution and
47

not as interest.

If the Wolf case arose now, presumably the so-called interest payment would likewise be treated as a distribution, probably within
the second tier. 48 If so, the estate's deduction and the amount taxable
to the beneficiary would be circumscribed by the amount and character of the estate's D.N.I
But even so, the question may properly be raised whether an
amount that is interest in the tax sense within all the conventional
tests49 should invariably be treated as interest for income tax pur-

poses. At times such treatment may be quite contrary to the conduit
philosophy of Subchapter J.50 Rules of state law requiring interest

46.

$40,000
$46,000

X $29,000 = $25,217.40.

47. Compare United States v. Folckemer, 307 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962).
48. The present provisions of the Code, in effect since 1954, set up a priority
system under which estate distributions are (1) fully taxable to the extent of
D.N.I. (the so-called first tier), (2) taxable to the extent of D.N.I. after first-tier
distributions are subtracted (the so-called second tier), or (3) possibly in an
equivocal status encompassing some annuity payments (sometimes called the
variable tier). Conceivably, the Wolf payments would escape second-tier status
as a tax-free widow's support allowance not required to be paid out of income.
See Treas. Reg. §1.661 (a)-2 (e) (1956).
49. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
50. The congressional approach to the taxation of income of estates (and
trusts, too) is essentially an either-or approach. Income of the entity is taxed
either to it (if the income is retained) or to beneficiaries (if income is distributed).
In general, distributions do not generate income; they merely allocate it, al-
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to be paid to pecuniary legatees do not limit payment to instances
in which the estate has earned interest on the amount of the legacy
or, indeed, has earned any income whatever. 51 In general, Subchapter
J seeks to prescribe the tax allocation of income between the estate
and the beneficiaries. 52 The D.N.I. concept, the distribution rules,
and the taxing pattern of Subchapter J effecting a conduit approach
are expressly designed so as to preclude harsh results reached under
the prior statute. 55 But, if an amount of interest required to be paid
to a beneficiary is treated as interest outside the taxing pattern of
Subchapter J, the effect is interest income taxable to the beneficiary, 54
even though the estate may have no taxable interest or indeed any
gross income. Are there not at least some circumstances in which
this is quite inappropriate?
The problem is illustrated by the case of Davidson v. United
States.55 In that case, the estate had earned only 20,907.06 dollars of
taxable income during 1947, the year in issue, but in that year it paid
189,000 dollars to the pecuniary legatees as "interest" on their legacies.
Under the law of Ohio, if administration of a will that provides for
pecuniary legacies is protracted, interest is added to the legacy beginning one year after the appointment of the executor and running to
the date on which the legacy is paid. Holding the legatees taxable
on only 21,000 dollars, the court reasoned that although the payments
had interest characteristics and were called "interest," they were
nevertheless more like estate distributions. The opinion indicates
that even under prior law, as at present, interest treatment of the
payments would be contrary to the statutory plan. The court said:
"The purpose of the statutory ensemble is to make certain that the
though in some rare instances transactions between the entity and its beneficiary

produce income on which one or the other may have to pay tax. See, e.g., Kenan
v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1940); Suisman v. Eaton, 15 F. Supp. 113
(D.C. Conn. 1935), af'd per curiam, 83 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299

U.S. 573 (1936) (involving possible realization of gain through the satisfaction of
a pecuniary bequest by a transfer of appreciated property). Again, these concepts
are fully explored in the forthcoming book mentioned in note 6 supra.

51. 6 BowE-PAmcER §59.11, at 413-14. "Whether such interest is a penalty
for ...[delay] in payment, or merely an incident of the legacy, is a question on
which [local] courts have differed." Id. at 412.
52. See note 50 supra.
53. See H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A197 (1954); S. RE. No.

1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 346-47 (1954). At an earlier time, the statute compelled
some anomalous results. See, e.g., Johnston v. Helvering, 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1945), in which a trust beneficiary was held
taxable on his distributable share of proceeds received by the trust from a defaulted mortgage although the total proceeds were less than the principal of the
mortgage and the trust therefore realized no gross income.
54. INT.R v. CoDE oF 1954, §61 (a) (4).

55. 137 Ct. Cl. 416, 149 F. Supp. 208 (1957).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

income of an estate is taxed, as income, either to the estate or to the
beneficiaries." 56
Where do these considerations lead? First, it is conceded that,
under the law as it is now, payments that are made to compensate
a legatee for delay in payment of his legacy, which therefore meet
the tax tests for interest57 must usually be treated as interest. Often
this works no great distortion. If the estate has income subject to tax
which exceeds the payment (and all other distributions as well), the
interest would be taxed to the beneficiary anyway; the estate gets an
interest deduction5s that has much the same effect as a distribution
deduction. Admittedly, there may be some differences-with respect
to timing and to characterization of income and regarding priorities
between the two tiers 59-but in many circumstances the statutory plan
is not violated by according interest treatment to the payments in
question.
However, it is equally clear that in some circumstances interest
classification for the payments in question is not supported at all by
the philosophy of Subchapter J. Perhaps there is still sufficient latitude in the statute to permit a court to label equivocal "interest"
payments "distributions," as was done in Davidson, when not to do
so would yield anomalous results. 0
56. Id. at 419, 149 F. Supp. at 210.
57. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §163.
59. An amount treated as interest for federal tax purposes would be entirely
outside the taxing pattern of Subchapter J. The estate's interest deduction,
authorized by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§163, 641 (b), would reduce the amount
of D.N.I. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, see §643 (a). This in turn could reduce the
amount of income tax required to be paid by the estate, or by beneficiaries in the
case of estate distributions. If the amount is treated as interest, the tax on an
equivalent amount of estate income is in effect shifted to the recipient. Qualitatively the interest deduction authorized by §163 is not affected by §265, which
disallows a deduction for expenses allocable to exempt income. Cf. Rev. Rul.
61-86, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 41. No part of the deduction need be allocated to items
of D.N.I. accorded special treatment. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §643 (a) (5).
The interest, a floating or general deduction, can be entirely allocated to items
of income subject to tax, reducing such items in D.N.I. to the tax advantage of
the estate or its beneficiaries.
With respect to the recipient, there may be a timing difference depending
on whether the so-called interest is treated as interest or as a distribution. If
interest, the amount is gross income to a cash method recipient in the taxable
year in which it is received by him. United States v. Folckemer, 307 F.2d 171,
173 (5th Cir. 1962); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §451 (a). If the amount is accorded
distribution status, the amount is gross income to the beneficiary in his taxable
year with or within which the estate's taxable year in which the distribution was
made ends. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§662 (a), (c). See, e.g., Hay v. United States,
67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83578 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
60. But the need for such judicial treatment may be mitigated, at least
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Finally, there is every reason for amending the statute to provide
that the payments here under consideration should always be treated
as distributions. This could be accomplished by providing in section
662 (a) (1) that any amount to which a legatee becomes entitled by
reason of the estate's nonpayment of his legacy, and whether accruing
from death or only from a later date, shall be treated as an amount
required to be paid out of income or corpus. This would place such
payments within the variable tier, 61 which seems to be where they
belong, and reduce the uncertainty presently illustated by the seemingly conflicting decisions in the Davidson62 and Folckeme 6

3

cases.

INCOME ON SPECIFIC LEGACIES

Specific legacies do not give rise to a claim for interest.6 4 Since
such a legacy is deemed to pass specific property together with accretions and income derived from the property itself, 65 the bequest is
fully satisfied when the property together with accrued income is paid
to the beneficiary. The subject of the bequest is not just generally
an amount, but property in kind. Similarly, a residuary legacy does
not pass an amount; it governs the disposition of the residue of the
estate, whatever its form may be, remaining after the payment of
claims and specific and pecuniary legacies.66 Such a residuary bequest
does not bear interest 7 but, much like a specific legatee, the "residuary legatee is entitled to receive any income earned by the estate
during the period of administration which is not otherwise disposed
of."s8

In most cases, a bequest of specific property will qualify for the
protection of section 663 (a) (1) 69 and, if so, the transfer of the property has no immediate income tax consequences either to the estate
or to the beneficiary. The general distribution rules of Subchapter J
are not applicable, and the receipt of the bequest by the beneficiary
is regarded as a tax-free inheritance of property for federal tax purposes.70 If, however, the subject of the specific legacy is property that
in part, in the year of termination of the estate. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§642 (h), which in general passes unused estate deductions on to the beneficiaries.
61. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §622(a)(1) (last sentence); Treas. Reg.
§1.662 (a)-2 (c) (1956); note 48 supra.
62. 137 Ct. Cl. 416, 149 F. Supp. 208 (1957).
63. 307 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1962).
64. 6 BowE-PAIUm §59.11, at 413.
65. Ibid; see also 3 Scowr §234.1, at 1778-79.
66. 6 Bowa-PARKER §59.11, at 413.
67. Ibid.
68. 3 ScoTr §234.3, at 1784.
69. See note 6 supra.
70.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §102 (a).
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produces income during administration of the estate, question arises
concerning the income tax treatment of any income produced by
such property.
If, as is usually the case, a legatee of specific property "is entitled
to any income accruing thereon from the death of the testator, even
though the legacy ...is not payable until the expiration of the period
of administration,' 7 1 who is taxed on such income, the estate or the
legatee? The answer to this question depends in part on the answer
to a further question: Is the property an asset of the Subchapter J
estate, or does the property pass outside the estate directly to the
beneficiary? The fact that under state law certain property of the
decedent may be considered vested at death in the heirs, legatees, or
devisees 72 does not necessarily mean that such property passes outside
the estate. If, under state law, the right of possession and control
of such property lodges in the personal representative during administration of the estate for purposes of paying debts, expenses, and
claims, as is often the case,73 the property is considered part of the
estate for federal tax purposes. This concept cannot be fully developed in this short article.74
The income from all property of a decedent, which legally comes
into the possession of the personal representative during the period
of administration, is includible in the gross income of the estate.75
The income could not sensibly for tax purposes be attributed initially
to the beneficiary because his rights are contingent and assured only
when administration of the estate is completed. Moreover, because
the beneficiary's claim is contingent, if the income were not ascribed
to the estate, it might escape tax altogether.76 Therefore, during
administration of the estate, the income from such property is gross
income of the estate, possibly taxable to beneficiaries7- but only within
71.

3 ScoTT §234.1, at 1778, See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §62-2907 (Supp. 1965);
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §320.753 (1949). Cf.
Baldwin v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mo. 1962).
72. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §731.21 (1965).
73. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §733.01 (1965).
74. See note 8 supra.
75. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §641 (a) (3); Treas. Reg. §1.641 (a)-2 (1956).
76. Cf. United States v. Cooke, 228 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1955). But cf. United
States v. DeBonchamps, 278 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1960).
77. In Estate of S. P. McBirney, 11 P-H BTA-TC Mem. 879 (1942), it was
contended that under Oklahoma law all property of a decedent was owned by his
heirs and that they, not the estate, should be taxable on the income arising from
the property after deduction of administration expenses. Denying this contention
and holding the estate taxable, the board stated: "It is immaterial that ownership of the property in question may have vested in the heirs at the time of the
decedent's death. It is plain that all of the decedent's property was subject to
administration as a part of the estate and that the administratrix was entitled
FLA. STAT. §§733.01, 731.22
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603

the distribution rules. Although a specific legatee is slated eventually
to be the economic owner of some such income, this income is initially
considered part of the gross income of the estate.
For the moment, let us make the unlikely assumption that the
income produced by property that is the subject of a specific bequest
is paid to the beneficiary in the same year that it is received by the
estate. If so, the taxpayer, with respect to income produced by such
property, is the beneficiary. Although the transfer of the property
itself may qualify under section 663 (a) (1), the income therefrom
which is paid to the beneficiary dearly does not.78 Thus, for example,
assume that the decedent specifically bequeathed 1,000 shares of X
corporation stock to B. If in one year during administration, the
estate receives 500 dollars in dividends on the X stock, it has income
on which it may very well have to pay tax.7 9 But, when the estate
transfers the stock to the specfic legatee in the same year, together
with dividends received on the stock, the distribution rules apply, not
to the stock which is received tax-flee, but to the dividends. Thus,
the estate is entitled to a distribution deduction and the beneficiary
is deemed to have dividend income80 The amount of such income,
at least if paid to the beneficiary in the same taxable year in which
it is received by the estate, has no effect on the estate's income tax
liability."' As a result of the distribtion rules, the tax liability is in
effect passed along with the income to the beneficiary.
The tier position82 of the beneficiary depends upon whether local
law or the terms of the governing instrument require such income
to possession of the property under the control of the court having probate

jurisdiction until the administration was completed." See also Kuldell v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1934) (relating to Texas law). See also Rev.
Rul. 59-375, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 161; Rev. Rul. 59-154, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 160;
Rev. Rul. 57-133, 1957-1 Cum. BuLL. 200. By contrast, of course, if the property
is not subject to any of the incidences of administration, passing by operation of
law to the "beneficiary," then any income produced by such property is considered gross income of the beneficiary and not the estate. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
64-101, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 77; I.T. 1596, II-1 Cuss. BULL. 130 (1923); cf. Hibernia
Nat'l Bank v. Donnelly, 121 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 487
(5th Cir. 1954). See also note 8 supra.
78. Ir-r. REv. CODE OF 1954, §102(b). See, e.g., Kuldell v. Commissioner, 69
F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1934); Wooley v. Malley, 30 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1929); Estate of
Catherine Donnelly, 31 B.T.A. 577 (1934). But cf. Foellinger v. Smith, 41-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 10380 (N.D. Ind. 1941).
79. IN . REv. CODE OF 1954, §§641(b), 61(a) (7). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§116 may exclude part of the divided from gross income.
80. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§661, 662.
81. Ibid. In these circumstances the estate is a pure conduit. See, e.g., Estate
of J. M. Jameson, 20 B.T.A. 103 (1930); Estate of Charles L. Grigg, 3 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 166 (1944).
82. See note 48 supra.
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to be distributed currently. In the unlikely event that such income is
required to be distributed currently, s3 it is in the first tier of taxable
priority.84 But if, as would more likely be the case, such income
merely may be distributed within the discretion of the executor, it
is within the second tier and considered as an amount properly paid
to such beneficiary. s 5 In either case, the amount distributed, perhaps
reduced by the amount of the dividend exclusion,86 is deductible by
the estate.87
Even continuing to assume current distribution, the characterization provisions of the distribution rules do not work as smoothly
here as the quantitative provisions. Generally all distributions are
deemed to consist of ratable amounts of net D.N.I. items with the
result that an estate beneficiary is considered to receive a ratable
share of each class of income entering the D.N.I. computation s8 This
means that generally beneficiaries receiving distributions are deemed
to receive ratable portions of all the classes of income received by the
estate. If this general rule is applied to amounts paid to a specific
legatee, distortion may occur. For example, a specific legatee of state
bonds, the interest on which is tax exempt, 89 would be charged with
(and possibly taxed on) a prorata share of all types of estate income,
which might include, in addition to tax exempt interest, dividends,
taxable interest, and rent. 90 This in turn could affect the amount
of the estate's distribution deduction, for the estate would not be
viewed as merely making a nondeductible distribution of exempt
income.91
As an economic fact, the beneficiary of a specific bequest may be
entitled only to the income produced by the property that is the subject
83. ibid; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§734.02-.04 (1965).
84. If in the first tier, such income would be taxable to the beneficiary
whether distributed or not. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §662 (a) (1).
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §662 (a)(2). See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank, 7 T.C.
1428 (1946), afJ'd sub nom. Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.
1948).
86.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §116.

To the extent that an estate is treated as

distributing exempt income, its distribution deduction is disallowed. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §661 (c). Under the either-or approach to the taxation of estate
income, note 50 supra, neither estate nor beneficiary is taxed on exempt income.
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §661. Of course any amount of such income
used by the estate to pay claims would not be distributable and would not give
rise to a distribution deduction. As to such amounts, the estate would be required to pay the income tax, cf. Carrie G. Cox, 31 B.T.A. 819 (1934), unless
the nature of the claims paid qualify them for deductions under some other
provisions of the Code. Cf. Rev. Rul. 66-201, 1966 INT. REV. BULL. 29, at 6.
88. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §662 (b) and text accompanying note 96 infra.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §103.
90. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §662 (b).
91. See note 86 supra.
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of the specific bequest. The statute states that the ratable characterization rule shall apply "unless the terms of the governing instrument
specifically allocate different classes of income to different beneficiaries." 92 The Regulations broaden this provision by adding that the
ratable rule shall not apply if "local law requires . . . [a specific]
allocation."93 It would seem that if pursuant to local law a beneficiary is entitled to the income produced by designated property-the
subject of a specific bequest-this would be a specific allocation of
such income within the meaning of the Regulations. 94 It is our conclusion that such income, although entering the D.N.I. computation,
is identified or traced to the legatee, if distributed in the year in which
it is received by the estate, and that it retains its same character
in the hands of such legatee. This in turn will affect the determination of the estate's distribution deduction since, if the income should
be tax exempt interest, the estate will get no deduction as a result
of the distribution. 95
Two further consequences flow from the conclusion reached.
First, when the amount paid to a specific legatee is identified as
income from the property that is the subject of the specific legacy,
the payment of such amount effects a quantitative reduction of
D.N.I. and, second, the D.N.I. class made up of income with the
character of such income is reduced for purposes of applying the
general characterization rules of section 662 (b). Although there is
no statutory authority for the first adjustment, and little more than
an inference drawn from administrative pronouncements in support
of the second adjustment,96 such adjustments are necessary to avoid
results not consistent with the plan of Subchapter J. Thus, if the
executor should make distributions to beneficiaries other than a
specific legatee during the same taxable year in which the income
of the specific legacy is distributed, such other distributions, although
dearly subject to quantitative and qualitative D.N.I. limitations,
cannot properly be viewed as containing any amount or character of
the income accruing on a specific legacy which has been paid to a
92.

INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, §662 (b).
93. Treas. Reg. §§1.662 (b)-1, 1.661 (b)-I (1956).

94. Ibid.
95. See note 86 supra.
96. See note 93 supra and accompanying text. INT.

REv. CODE OF 1954,

§ §662 (a), (b) would of course be applicable, but the quantitative and qualitative
allocation would apply without taking into account the income from the
specific property. See 3 ScoTr §234.2. In Baldwin v. United States, 214 F. Supp.
16 (E.D. Mo. 1962), the district court held, under Missouri law, that the income
beneficiaries of residuary trusts were not entitled to the income received by the
estate during probate which was attributable to assets subject to specific bequests.

Cf. Estate of J. M. Jameson, 20 B.T.A. 103 (1930).
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specific legatee. Therefore, to avoid distortion as to other distributions, it is necessary to reduce the amount and character of D.N.I.
by the amount and class of income attributable to the property comprising the specific legacy.
The present statute also copes poorly with the more likely situation in which the income generated by property specifically bequeathed is retained by the estate during administration and distributed to
the specific legatee later, possibly within one taxable year. Taxable
income of the estate for the current year, as modified by the D.N.I.
definitional provision, 97 serves as the measuring rod for determining
the amount and character of amounts distributed to estate beneficiaries. Amounts of income earned in prior years by property that is
the subject of a specific bequest do not affect the amount or character
of estate distributions. The so-called "throw-back" rule, 98 which
would alter this conclusion, while applicable to trusts, does not apply
to estates. 99 Thus, income accumulated by the estate, even if earned
by property specifically bequeathed, is taxed to the estate. On termination of the estate, the beneficiaries are taxed on distributions not
protected by section 663 (a) (1) to the extent of the amount and
character of income comprising D.N.I., and the estate is entitled to
a corresponding deduction.100 But, only D.N.I. for the year of distribution is taken into account for this purpose.
Suppose a beneficiary is entitled to specific property together
with the income attributable to such property. Thus, beneficiary B
might be entitled to receive certain state bonds as a specific bequest,
and the receipt of the bonds themselves would escape income tax
under section 663 (a) (1) .10, The interest received by the estate during
the year of distribution would be traced directly into B's hands, as
previously indicated. As to such interest, the estate is a pure con0
duit.1 2 However, what about the interest on such bonds received by
the estate in preceding years? Should that also flavor the amount
received by B? That is, should all he receives have that satisfying
tax-exempt flavor? At present the statute makes no provision for such
a logical result. However sensible it might be to look upon B's entire
receipts (beyond the bequeathed property itself) as tax exempt
interest, the fact remains that under the present statute it is only
income of the current year that is taken into consideration in measuring and characterizingwhat he receives.
97.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §643 (a).

98. See Subpart D of Subchapter J, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§665-69.
99. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §665; Treas. Reg. 1.665 (a)-o (1956).
100.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§662, 661.

101. See note 6 supra.
102. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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The problem is compounded if during preceding years the executor made distributions to other beneficiaries, none of whom had any
interest in or right to the income attributable to property that is the
subject of a specific bequest. 03 In economic reality, no part of income
attributable to specific bequest property can be viewed as paid to
residuary or other beneficiaries other than the specific legatee. But
the distribution rules make a ratable allocation of such income, along
with all other income of the estate, quite without regard to who has
an ultimate right to it. Thus, other beneficaries may have enjoyed
an exemption with respect to state bond interests that belongs to a
specific legatee. Even if this is an anomaly, there is a question, however, whether amendments designed to provide a nicer allocation and
to provide also an estate throw-back rule would not unmercifully
complicate the statute.

103. Cf. Baldwin v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 16 (E.D. Mo. 1962); note
96 supra.
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